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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
MICHAEL STEPHEN
)
HEARTSILL,
)
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

NO. 46813-2019
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR42-18-6231

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court sentenced Michael Stephen Heartsill to forty years, with twenty-three
years fixed, for twenty-five counts of sexual exploitation of a child by possessing child
pornography. Mr. Heartsill appeals, and he argues the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts Course of Proceedings
The State filed a criminal complaint alleging Mr. Heartsill committed fifty counts of
sexual exploitation of a child by possessing or accessing sexually exploitative images and videos.
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(R., pp.33-50.) Mr. Heartsill waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over to
district court. (R., pp.54, 55-58.) The State filed an Information charging him with fifty counts
of sexual exploitation of a child. (R., pp.60-80.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Heartsill pled
guilty to the first twenty-five counts. (R., pp.107, 108; Tr., p.37, L.17-p.40, L.16.) The
remaining counts were dismissed. (R., p.134.) The State did not agree to a sentencing
recommendation. (R., p .108.)
At sentencing, the State recommended an aggregate sentence of forty years, with
twenty-five years fixed. (Tr., p.65, Ls.9-10.) Mr. Heartsill's counsel did not request a specific
sentence, but asked the district court to keep in mind that the statutory maximum for this offense
was ten years. (Tr., p.86, Ls.11-18, p.87, Ls.1-16.) The district court sentenced Mr. Heartsill to
an aggregate term of forty years, with twenty-three years fixed. (Tr., p.98, L.11-p.99, L.3.)
Specifically, the district court imposed a sentence of ten years, with six years fixed, for the first
three counts, and ten years, with five years fixed, for count four, with these sentences to run
consecutively. (Tr., p.98, Ls.12-23.) For counts five to twenty-five, the district court imposed a
sentence often years, with five years fixed, for each count, to be served concurrently. (Tr., p.98,
L.23-p.99, L.3.)
Mr. Heartsill timely appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.126-32, 141--44.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate sentence of forty years,
with twenty-three years fixed, upon Mr. Heartsill, following his guilty plea to twenty-five counts
of sexual exploitation of a child?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of Forty
Years, With Twenty-Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Heartsill, Following His Guilty Plea To
Twenty-Five Counts Of Sexual Exploitation Of A Child
"It is well-established that ' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence."' State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Heartsill's sentences do not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 18-1507(2)(a), (3). Accordingly, to show that the aggregate sentence
imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Heartsill "must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002).
"'Reasonableness' of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. "A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the

primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution." State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011). "The
decision of whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is within the sound
discretion of the trial court." State v. Helms, 130 Idaho 32, 35 (Ct. App. 1997); see also
LC. § 18-308.
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In this case, Mr. Heartsill asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district
court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment in light of the mitigating
factors, including his traumatic childhood, acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and amenability
to treatment.
Mr. Heartsill’s difficult childhood supports a more lenient sentence. The Court of
Appeals has recognized that a defendant’s “extremely troubled childhood is a factor that bears
consideration at sentencing.” State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). Here,
Mr. Heartsill grew up in a rural, secluded area with his parents and two older siblings.
(Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 p.9.) Mr. Heartsill did not have very many friends,
and his siblings were older, so Mr. Heartsill was isolated and an outcast growing up. (PSI, p.9.)
Mr. Heartsill’s father was an alcoholic and physical and sexually abusive. (PSI, p.10.) His father
would force him and his siblings to watch pornography. (PSI, p.10.) His father also left
pornography throughout the house. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Heartsill and his siblings “lived in fear never
knowing what [their father] was going do to.” (PSI, p.10.) One time, after Mr. Heartsill’s father
caught him masturbating, his father took a knife to Mr. Heartsill’s penis and threatened to cut it
off if he ever did it again. (PSI, pp.10, 32.) Mr. Heartsill’s sister wrote that their father once tied
her up when she was naked and burned her with cigarettes. (PSI, p.10.) As another example of
this physical and mental abuse, Mr. Heartsill’s sister explained that Mr. Heartsill’s father was
unhappy with a glass of milk that Mr. Heartsill had brought to him, so his father grabbed
Mr. Heartsill’s hand and squeezed it until the glass shattered. (PSI, p.10.) His father then hit him
for spilling the milk. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Heartsill described that his father was detached, a
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"perfectionist," and "hard to please." (PSI, pp.9-10, 29.) Mr. Heartsill was always trying to get
his approval and felt like he never measured up. (PSI, pp.9-10.) In addition to his abusive father,
Mr. Heartsill was sexually abused by his step-aunt (who was six years older than him) from ages
six or seven to fifteen. (PSI, pp.9, 28.) His parents did not believe him, but his sister confirmed
this abuse. (PSI, pp.9-10.) These facts of Mr. Heartsill's traumatic childhood support a lesser
sentence.
In addition, Mr. Heartsill accepted responsibility and was amenable to treatment.
Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of mitigation. State v.

Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In the PSI, Mr. Heartsill stated, "I realize I can't do this
alone and I need/want to get help." (PSI, p.17.) He also explained:
There are deep-rooted internal issues I need to work on. I have been sober minded
and not indulged in pornography for over 5 years. I thought I was done with that
aspect ofmy addiction, I thought I was strong enough. However, when life threw
punches, I went back to how I knew to deal with it. I realize I cannot do this
alone. I want help to overcome-I need my core beliefs rebuilt. I have built my life
on false teachings and opinions of others. Always seeking affirmation from
others. Through this I have been feeling shame, guilt, disgust. I was selfish and
rationalized my behavior and try to justify it, while I was in that behavior. I felt
lost and alone and stuck. This is not the life I want. I feel bad for what I have
done. Everyone says my crime is a victimless crime but those children are
victimized every time those images are viewed I put my family through a lot
because of this. Many people were affected because of my behavior.
(PSI, p.17 (sic).) Similarly, Mr. Heartsill stated at sentencing that he knew he had a problem and
he wanted to change. (Tr., p.87, L.23-p.24.) He said he accepted responsibility. (Tr., p.88, Ls.23.) He wanted discipline, structure, and treatment. (Tr., p.89, Ls.11-13.) He also recognized that
he was complacent, did not communicate, and failed to ask for help when he needed it.
(Tr., p.89, L.13-p.90, L.14.) Hr. Heartsill's plan for success included open communication with
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Citations to the PSI refer to the ninety-nine page electronic document with the confidential
exhibits.
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his sister, group and individual counseling, a sober recovery group, working on a budget and
paying his debts, obtaining steady employment, and purchasing a home. (Tr., p.90, Ls.20-23,
p.91, Ls.3-19.) Further, Mr. Heartsill apologized to the district court and his family. (Tr., p.88,
Ls.5-7, p.90, Ls.15-16, p.91, Ls.20-22.) He explained:
I know I can be a better man, and I want to be that better man, but I
honestly need and want the help. Your Honor, I humbly ask you for mercy. I
know I don't deserve anything, but I want to get my life back. I want to get it back
on track. I want to deal with the hurts and habits of my past so I can reconcile and
not live in that past anymore.
I need the help, and I want the help to tear down my core values and apply
me with structure and give me a foundation I can truly build on while dealing
with my deepest root issues, because I can't do this alone.
(Tr., p.91, L.22-p.92, L.9.) Finally, although he was deemed a high-risk to reoffend,
Mr. Heartsill expressed interest in treatment, was "capable of engaging meaningfully in
treatment," and would benefit from treatment. (PSI, pp.47, 49.) Mr. Heartsill's acceptance of
responsibility, remorse, and amenability to treatment stand in favor of a lesser sentence.
In summary, Mr. Heartsill maintains the district court did not exercise reason and thus
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. Proper consideration of the mitigating
factors warranted a lesser term of imprisonment for the offenses.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Heartsill respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 24th day of June, 2019.
/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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